STANTON v. HAVERHILL BRIDGE CO.

It is to the mere intimation of a doubt by a plurality of th'i Barons
in Rex v. Humphrey, that we owe the vague impression of a
possible difference between the lien of warehousemen and wharfingers. Ordinarily the wharfinger's charges accrue for the mere
passing over his wharves of freight, in the loading and unloading
of cargo; he expends no labor or skill upon the goods, and has
but the slightest tenure of possession ; whereas, in the storing of
goods, the warehouseman has a continuous and well-defined possession, and bestows labor and skill upon them. However, we
take it, upon principle and authority, there is no substantial
difference.
While the cases in Espinasse's Reports were determined at nisi
priu8, yet the eminence of the jurists who presided, of the counsel
employed, with the universal acquiescence signified by the lapse
of three-quarters of a century without their being disturbed,
together with the confirmation they received in the Exchequer.
of Pleas from Rex v. Humphrey, have impressed upon them the
stamp of very respectable authority.
ROBT. G. STREET.
GALVESTON,

Texas.
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Supreme Court of Vermont.
JOHN STANTON AND WIFE v. HAVERIILL BRIDGE CO.
The question of the competency of a foreign corporation to be sued is admitted
by a general appearance from term to term and filing no dilatory plea.
A bridge corporation, which demands and receives tolls of travellers, is bound to
keep its bridge and approaches in safe condition for use, and cannot excuse
itself by impeaching its own title to maintain the same.

Tuis was an action on the case by a toll-paying traveller to
recover damages for a personal injury to the wife, accruing from
the insufficient condition of defendant's bridge across Connecticut
river. The other facts appear in the opinion, which was delivered by
REDFIELD, J.-I.
However defective was the service of this
process, we think the appearance of the defendant, by counsel, at
the first term, and suffering a"general continuance for that and the
succeeding term of the court, is a waiver of all dilatory pleas, and
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of all objection to the service of the writ : Huntley v. Henry et al.,
37 Vt. 165; State v. Bichmond, 6 Foster 232. "A voluntary
and general appearance in an action not only gives jurisdiction of
the parties, but cures any irregularity in the service of the process :"
arpenter v. Minturn, 65 Barb. The defendant's plea
does not allege or claim that the writ was not properly served, but
that the defendant, being a foreign corporation, existing and doing
business under the laws of New Hampshire, and having no franchise or property in this state, the courts in this state could not
take or have jurisdiction of the persons or the subject-matter of
this suit. The replication avers that the defendant is the owner
of land in this state, on which the western abutment of the said
bridge stands, and that the injuries complained of accrued by
reason of the insufficiency in that part of said bridge. The
general appearance, and continuance of the case, without objection
to the service, was a waiver of all questions as to the regularity of
the service, and a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the defendant. And the facts averred in
the plea or replication could neither give nor take away such jurisdiction. It has often been held that the courts of this state may
take jurisdiction of a foreign corporation when properly impleaded,
and that a general appearance by an attorney gives such jurisdiction: Hall v. Ft. J' Mass. B. B. Cu., 28 Vt. 409. The case
of March v. Eastern B. 1B. Co., 40 N. H. 551, is a thorough
examination of this subject.
II. The more important inquiry is as to the liability of the defendant for damages occasioned by the insufficiency of the bridge
at the place of injury. This defendant had its artificial being by
an act of the legislature of New Hampshire, and could not do
strictly corporate acts without that jurisdiction. But there seems
no question that a corporation may act, by its agents and servants,
beyond the limits of the sovereignty that created it: 1 Redfield
on Railways 57.
If the liability of the defendant were limited by the western
boundary of New Hampshire, a traveller who had paid toll, and
thereby obtained defendant's contract and guaranty for safe passage across its bridge, would be without remedy for injuries
received from defective planking in the westerly end of the main
bridge, because the western abutment and western end of the main
bridge was without the state of New Hampshire aid within Ver-
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mont; and that would be relieving the defendant from liability for
breach of its contract, implied by taking toll, and from the duties
it had assumed to the travelling public, because it occupies, and
cannot discharge its proper functions without occupying, a portion
of the soil of Vermont. The defendant has occupied the land
within this state for its abutment and bridge, and used the same
for public travel, for near forty years; and continuously invited
travel, for toll, over its structure, without molestation, under a
claim of right, and with the implied possession of the sovereignty
of this state. And there would seem no good reason, in morals or
law, that the defendant should be excused from the performance
of its contract by alleging that the duties it had assumed were
beyond its corporate functions.
Joint-stock companies, for mining and other purposes, and sometimes for mere mischief, like the "6Cedit Mobilier," often have
their corporate life and being from' the grant of one state, and
exercise their entire functions in another state or territory; yet its
contracts are binding on the corporation, though its charter
might be vacated, or such acts enjoined by proper proceedings in
equity: Miller v. .Ewen, 27 Mo. 509; 1 Redf. on Railw. 57, note.
The Boston, Concord & Montreal R. R. Co. was created by act
9f the legislature of New Hampshire, yet the corporation has extended its railway some one hundred miles into this state, to a
junction with other railways in this state, and have been carrying
passengers and freight over that portion of its road for twenty
years. The sovereign power of this state was invoked in the Supreme Court to prevent the exercise of such rights, but without
avail: State v. B., (.
H. R. B. Co., 25 Vt. 443. Although it
is the prerogative right of this state to prevent that corporation
from operating its railway within this state, yet reason, justice and
all analogy would require that such corporation-should be responsible for its contracts and the performance of the duties which it
assumes, and that a passenger, who had paid his fare from Concord
to Wells River, if injured by the actionable carelessness of the
corporation, on this portion of its railway, might require it to
respond in damages. The corporation could not be excused from
doing what, upon sufficient consideration, it had agreed to do, by
alleging its incapacity to enter into such a contract. In McOluer
v. Manchester& Lawrence'B. B. Co., 18 Gray 124, the defendant
corporation, existing under the laws of New Hampshire, received
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goods to carry from some point in Massachusetts to Manchester,
N. H., and the goods were lost, by the carelessness of the carriers,
in Massachusetts. The defendant alleged in defence that it had
no legal capacity to contract, or become responsible as carriers,
without the state of New Hampshire. The court (HOAR, J.) held
otherwise, and said, "they were in actual possession and use of the
road, without obstruction from the Commonwealth; and they
received the plaintiff's property, and agreed that it should be
safely kept and transported to its destination. It is no answer to
a breach of that agreement to deny the validity of their own contract." So this defendant, for good consideration, agreed to give
safe passage to the plaintiff upon its bridge across Connecticut
river; and if plaintiff was injured by the neglect of defendant to
keep and maintain its bridge in safe condition, it is neither a just
nor legal response to such claim to damages for this broken contract and wrong to such traveller, to aver that there is doubt about
defendant's right to occupy the land on which the bridge rests.
As between the traveller and the defendant, the former has no
concern with the defendant's right or title; it is enough that the
corporation was in possession and the traveller paid for the use of
the bridge. But it is insisted that the place where the injury
occurred is outside the bridge. The place of injury was in the
inclined planking, about f6ur feet wide, descending from the level
flooring of the main bridge to the road-bed made of earth. This
was fastened to the main structure by spikes, and the roof of the
bridge extended over and beyond it. It was the transit platform
from the main framework of the bridge to land, made by defendant
when the bridge was constructed in 1834, and maintained and used
by defendant for toll-paying passengers ever since; and without
this or some similar provision, it is evident that travellers could
not pass and repass with facility or safety. The bridge was imperfect without it.
III. It is insisted that this portion of the bridge is upon and
over the highway, as established by law in the town of Newbury,
in this state. The record of the highway as established is as
follows, viz.: "beginning at the westerly end of the planking in
the main bridge over Connecticut river (it being understood and
agreed that the proprietors of said bridge always keep in repair
the whai-fing by them made)."
It would seem that the bridge and wharfing had bean made and
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completed when the highway to meet it was established; and as
between the town of Newbury and the defendant, the latter
assumed to keep the wharfing to the bridge in repair. Whether
the defendant would be liable to a traveller for an injury by reason
of an insufficient wharfing, or for the want of a railing on the
approaches to the bridge, being a portion of the structure which
the defendant is bound to keep in repair, and for the use of which
toll was taken, the case does not require us to discuss or decide.
This apron of the bridge was essentially a part of the bridge.
It was constructed with and as a part of it in 1834. It has ever
been made fast to the framework of the bridge. It is necessary to
enable travellers to pass to the wharfing and upon the highway.
It is a necessary part of the structure to enable travellers to pass
from the highways of one state to those of another, for which purpose the defendant was incorporated, and for the use of such structure the defendant has for the last forty years taken toll.
The fact that a portion of such structure is over a highway, even
if such highway were established without any condition that defendant should ever keep it in repair for the safety of travellers, is
no reason why defendant should not perform its contracts or discharge the duties it had assumed.
In Davis v. Lamoille -PlankIload Co., 27 Vt. .604, it appeared
that the defendant, in constructing its plank road, had occupied
the established highway in the town of Stowe. By contract with
said town, the company had agreed to protect the town from all
damages occasioned to travellers by reason of an insufficient road.
The corporation defended on"the ground that the town were alone
liable; but the court held otherwise. And Chief Justice RgDFIELD, in giving the opinion of the court, says: "If it could be
maintained (which we think it could not) that the town of Stowe
were liable for giving up their highway before the defendants had
built a proper plank road, it would not excuse the defendants, after
opening their road and taking tolls; * * the liability to pay tolls
is a consideration for the undertaking, on the part of the corporation, to furnish a safe road for the use of the travellers as an
equivalent. It is the same in principle as any other contract
where service is performed for pay. There is an implied undertaking, from the general rules of law applicable to such subjects,
that the person undertaking such service, whether it be a natural
or artificial person, shall perform it faithfully."
VOL. XXIII.-6to

474

STANTON v. HAVERHILL BRIDGE CO.

The claim of the defendant, that it intruded itself upon another's
right, and assumed duties which belonged to another to, perform, is
no excuse for not performing its contracts and discharging the
duties which, for pay, it had assumed. Such a defence is, as
Judge HOAR well says, in 13th Gray, supra, "like an innkeeper
sued for lost luggage, alleging in defence that his landlord was
without legal title, and therefore he was keeping inn without legal

right."
An eminent public man in this state, construing the statute
strictly, as town auditor, rejected the charge of the overseers for
the expense of the burialof a town pauper, on the ground that the
statute provides for the "support," and not the burialof the town's
poor; that it was a provision for the living, and not the dead. It
is difficult to find fault with this logic. But when the end and
purpose of the statute is considered, that decision, subjected to the
analysis of the average common-sense layman, would seem unreasonable -andabsurd. This corporation was authorized to build and
keep in repair a bridge across a river, which was the dividing
boundary of two states, and take toIls, and nothing more. But
when it is considered that the end and purpose of the grant was to
afford a feasible and safe transit from the highways of one state to
the other, for teams and travellers, and that defendant constructed
this appendage to its bridge structure, and made it fast to the
bridge and under its roof, and maintained and used it, and invited
travel over it for pay, and that for forty years, with bis right unchallenged, as a means of transit from the highways of one state
to the other, as between the corporation and the traveller and
patrons who had paid toll, the defendant should be held responsible for the reasonable safety of the means provided for such
passage.
We find no error, and the judgment of the County Court is
affirmed.
The opinion in this case seems to rest
upon such unquestionable grounds that
we fear anything we may add, by way
of comment or annotation, will have the
appearance of an attempt to fortify what
does not require it. But this being one
of a class of cases considerably numerous in the courts, and to some extent in
the reports, where the profession, and

sometimes the courts even, seem to feel
special satisfaction in devising some
plausible grounds for defeating the plaintiff's claim, contrary to its general equity
and justice, as if it were evidence of
uncommon firmness in adhering to principles at the expense of justice, we may
be justified in adding our testimony, as
we have often done before, in favor of
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following the general obvious justice of
a case, where there are no invincible obstacles of a technical character in the
way, and of showing our keenness of
wit, if anywhere, rather in overcoming
technical obstructions than in conjuring
them up.
1. There seems to be no fair ground
in this case to claim that the place
where the defect existed which caused
the injury, was not properly treated as
a portion of the defendants' bridge. It
was in a portion of the platform or passage from the main bridge to the road,
which was constructed of planks and
fastened by the defendants to the main
structure of the bridge with spikes;
and was under the cover of the bridge.
This would seem to be a sufficient estoppel upon the defendants, to show that
they could not deny it being part of the
bridge. As between the defendants and
the town, it seems very obvious that this
place came fairly within the portion of
the highway or bridge which it was the
defendants' duty to maintain. But this
is in fact wholly immaterial, as between
the parties to this action. If the defendants took toll of the plaintiff for the
use of their bridge, it was wholly immaterial whether they did it rightfully or
not, as between them and other pasties.
It is settled, by a uniform current of
decisions, since the date of the common
law almost, that any one in the possession and use of permanent property
must keep it in a safe condition, so as
not to cause injury to those whom he
allows to use it or to come upon it.
The rule has been applied to mere strangers, who paid nothing for the use of
the same: Barnes v. Ward, 2 Carr. &
K. 661. And the rule applies with special force where the party pays 4t toll for
the use of a7 turnpike or plank road:
Randall v. Cheshire Turnp. Co., 6 N.
H. 147; Townshend v. Susquehanna
Turnp. Co., 6 Johns. 90; Davis v.
Lamnoille Co. P. Road Co., 27 Vt. 602.
This question was very extensively and

learnedly examined in the House of
Lords, not many years back, in The
Mersey Docks 4- Harbor Co. v. Gibbs,
Law Rep. I Ho. Lds. 93; a. c. 12 Jur.
N. S. 571, where it was held that the
plaintiffs, although merely a public company, created for building and maintaining their works, for public use, and deriving no private emolument from the
tolls collected for the building and repair of these docks, were nevertheless
responsible for any injury suffered by
any one in such use through default of
repair, which defendants ought to have
made. And in the very recent -ase of
Winch v. The Conservatorsofthe Thames,
L. R. 9 C. P. 378, it was held that the
mere fact of keeping open the tow-path
on the upper Thames, and inviting travellers to use it for a toll, imposed the
duty upon the defendants, as a public
company, to keep the same in safe repair throughout its whole extent, or else
to give warning of any existing defects.
These public companies, in the last two
cases, were held liable to the same extent as private companies doing the
same thing. The cases are too numerous to require further citation to show
that all turnpike or bridge companies
taking toll for the use of their roads or
bridges, are responsible for all injuries
suffered by travellers through any defects or want of repair in such structures.
2. But it seems to have been claimed
in this case that the defendants might
excuse themselves by showing that they
did not hold any legal title to maintain
their bridge beyond the line of New
Hampshire. They seemed to have obtained title to the land upon which the
portion of the bridge in Vermont stood,
and to have maintained the structure
upon it, and used it as a portion of their
toll-bridge for nearly forty years, more
than twice the term of the Statute of
Limitations in that state upon rights of
entry upon land. This was no doubt
perfect title as against all but the state,
and would probably have barred even
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the state from any proceeding to obtain
a forfeiture of the right to maintain that
portion of the bridge which was in Vermont, upon the ground of a presumptive
grant by the state from such long acquiescence.
But without assuming that point, it
is well settled that no such con~pany,
exercising the functions of granting
passage for toll, whether a bridge or
turnpike company, or a railway company, can escape from their otherwise
legal responsibility on the ground of
holding any portion of their structures
by a defective title as against the state:
Feitalv. M3iddlesex Ry., 109 Mass. 398;
11"cClure v. A. 6- L. Ry., 13 Gray 124;
lad. By., 22
Bissell v. Mich. So. 6- NV.
N.Y. 258. But the rule may be carried
The plaintiff is not
much further.
bound, in order to recover damages for
an injury sustained in such case, through
the negligence of companies in possession of turnpikes, bridges or railways,
and demanding tolls for the use of the
same, to prove that the defendants were
rightfully entitled to receive such tolls.
The fact that the defendants exercised
the functions of owners, and received
the lawful emoluments as such, is conclusive evidence against them tbat this
was done rightfully. To suppose the
contrary, involves an absurdity that few
men, not largely schooled in dialectic
refinements, could seriously entertain.
If one should ride a horse over a child
in the street and seriously injure it
through mere carelessness, or allow one
to enter his premises and fall down a
trap-door not properl secured, we
should never expect him to attempt to
defend himself on the ground that he
had not yet acquired full and perfect
title to the horse or the farm. But
when we come to apply the same reasoning to a public company, there seems
to be something which renders it more
plausible to allow such a defence than
in the case of natural persons. We con-

fess our inability to comprehend wherein
the difference lies.
3. But in regard to the claim that
the suit should have been against
the town, if it could be clearly shown
that the town had assumed to extend
their highway over the place where
the injury occurred, and thus- made
themselves primarily responsible for its
repair, which seems to us not even a
plausible construction or contention, in
this case there would probably be some
who, under such an assumption, might
think the action should have been
brought against the town. But so long
as the injury occurred upon the bridge
and its necessary approaches, which constitutes the entire structure for which toll
was demanded by and paid to the defendants, they would be estopped to deny in
the action that it was their bridge, or to
claim that its maintenance and support
rested upon any other person, natural
or artificial. And it would make no
difference in the result if there were no
equitable estoppel upon the defendants
in regard to recognising their responsibility for the safe condition of the entire
structure for which they received toll of
the plaintiff, and it were allowable to
prove in the action, that some town or
towns, or, some one else, either in Vermont or New Hampshire, were equally
responsible with the defendants, either
jointly or independently, for keeping
the entire bridge in repair, since it
would impose no obligation upon the
plaintiffs to go against such parties and
not against defendants. Itis no defence
that other parties are equally liable for
the same'neglect or wrong for which defendants are sued: Ricker v. Freeman, 11
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 692 ; COLT, J.,
inEaton v. B. 4- L. By., 11 Allen 500;
Burrows v. U. G. 6 C. Co., L. R. 5
Exch. 67; a. c. 7 id. 90. So that in
any view we are able to take of the
case it seems to rest upon most unquestionable grounds.
I. F. R.
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S'upreme Court of .Errorsof Connecticut.
FRANCES C. DOWD v. JOSEPHII . TUCKER.
An aunt of the respondent, with whom she lived and to whom by her will she
had given all her property, upon her death-bed desired to change her will and give
a certain piece of real estate to a niece, and had a codicil prepared for that purpose. Before signing the codicil, she wished to secure the consent of the respon(lent to the change and had him called in for the purpose. After hearing her, he
replied that she was weak and that she need not trouble herself to sign the codicil,
hut that he would deed the property to the niece and carry out her wishes. Trusting in his promise, she did not change her will. After her death, the respondent
refused to convey to the niece. On a bill in equity brought by her to compel him
to convey, it was held that he took the property under a trust for her, which a court
of equity would enforce.
And held, too, that the case was one of fraud, it being clearly inferable from
his refusal to convey after the death of the testatrix, that he made his promise to
her with an intention not to perform it.
The procuring of property upon a promise which the party at the time does not
intend to perform, is a fraud. And it makes no difference whether the property
is real or personal.

BILL IN EQUITY to compel the conveyance of real estate.

The

following facts were found by a committee:
The petitioner is a niece, and the respondent is a nephew, of
Franceg M. Hayden, who died September 3d 1870.
On the 27th of May 1863, Mrs. Hayden made a will, by which
she gave all her property to the respondent, which will, after her
death, was proved as her last will and testament.
At the time of her -death, she was the owner of one-half of a
dwelling-house and lot, worth $750, being the property in dispute
between the parties. She also owned other property, and left an
estate, real and personal, after paying all charges, amounting to
$2640. From 1863 to the time of her death, she was an inmate,
most of the time, of the respondent's family. But she was not a
pecuniary burden to him. At times, especially when ill, she went
to her own house (which was in the same yard with the respondent's), and was cared for to some extent by the petitioner and her
mother. For such services during her last sickness the petitioner
has been allowed her claim by the commissioners on the estate, as
hereinafter stated.
About two weeks before her death, Mrs. Hayden desired and
intended to give to the petitioner her part of the dwelling-house,
and to change her will accordingly, but was unwilling to do so
without the consent of the respondent. The petitioner thereupon
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caused a codicil to be prepared giving to the petitioner the dwellinghouse. This codicil was presented to testatrix, upon which she,
without signing it, expressed a desire to see the respondent. The
respondent was then called into the room, and she informed him
that she wanted to give her half of the dwelling-house to the petitioner, if he was willing, and asked him if he was willing, saying
again that she wanted to do so. The respondent replied that she
was weak, and that she need not trouble herself to sign the paper,
but that he would deed the property to the petitioner, and would
do just as she wanted to have him. The testatrix expressed herself satisfied that the respondent would do as he agreed, and did
not sign the codicil. This interview was on Sunday, about 2
o'clock in the afternoon. Mrs. Hayden was at that time capable
of making a will.
The respondent was the executor of her will, and as such represented her estate to be insolvent, and it was settled as an insolvent
estate.
The petitioner presented to the commissioners on the estate a
claim for $1300. It was a part of her claim that she should be
allowed a sum equal to the value of the dwelling-house, on the
ground of an alleged promise by Mrs. Hayden that she would give
it to her. This claim was rejected by the commissioners on the
gtound that it was not within their jurisdiction. But they allowed
the sum of $150 for services in taking care of the deceased during
her last sickness. The sum thus allowed was about $65 more than
the services were worth ; but the commissioners allowed it in consideration of the circumstances and condition of the parties, hoping
thereby to avoid litigation.
After the death of Mrs. Hayden, the petitioner demanded of
the respondent that he should execute to her a deed of the premises in question; but he refused, and has ever since refused to
do so. The respondent is now in possession of the property, claiming it as his own, and denying that the petitioner has any rights
or interest therein.
Upon these facts the case was reserved for the advice of the
court.
The respondent holds the
Chadwick, for the petitioner. -1.
property as trustee for the petitioner. One who fraudulently
procures a bequest to be made to him by a promise as to
the use of the legacy, will be held a trustee f6r such use:
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'hurch v. Ruland, 64 Penn. St. R. 432; 1 Story Eq. Jur.
§§ 252, 256; 2 Id. § 781; 1 Jarman on Wills 346. And
it makes no difference in principle whether one procures a bequest to be made to him, or whether, a bequest having been
made to him, he prevents, by a promise, the execution of a codicil
giving the property to another. In equity, fraud includes all acts,
omissions and concealments by which an undue and unconscientious
advantage is taken of another: Story v. Norwich & Torcester B.
B. Co., 24 Conn. 118. If a committee, without expressly finding
fraud, report facts- from which an inference of fraud is unavoidably
made, the court will treat the transaction as fraudulent: Id. The
rule is, that when the facts are ascertained by the report of a committee, the existence of legal fraud is a question of law on facts
and intents: .Pettibone v. Stevens, 15 Conn. 26; Brainerd v.
Brainerd,Id. 576 ; Lavette v. Sage, 29 Id. 588. The facts found
in this case show a clear case of fraud.
2. But if there was no fraud, there was a trust. Property
given to one person to be delivered to another, is held by him in
trust: 2 Story E%. Jur., §§ 1041, 1196, 1197, 1201. And land
conveyed by deed or any instrument for the benefit of a third
person, is held in trust. Such trust may be proved by parol, and
equity will enforce it: a'ocker v. Higgins, 7 Conn. 342 ; Parions
r. Camp, 11 Id. 528; Baxter v. Gay, 14 Id. 119; Church v.
Sterling, 16 Id. 388; Collins v. Tillou, 26 Id. 375.
3. A person for whose benefit an agreement is made, though
not a party to the agreement, may maintain a suit in chancery for
its specific performance: Crocker v. Higgins, 7 Conn. 342.
Culver and Warner, for the respondent.-The petition proceeds upon the ground that the statute which requires wills
to be in writing, would have been complied with, but for the
promise of the respondent to deed the property to the petitioner. We admit that, in cases of fraud, equity will relieve
against the express words of the statute. But to constitute such
fraud, there must be deceit or misrepresentation, by means of
which the respondent obtained the devise, which would otherwise
have gone to the petitioner. It must be deceit or misrepresentation, as distinguished from a mere breach of promise, however
wrongful: 2 Lead. Cas. in Equity 708; Montacute v. 1lfaxwell, 1
P. Wins. 618; 2 Story Eq. Jur., § 781; Chturo v. Buland, 64

DOWD v. TUCKER.

Penn. St. R. 482. It is found that, "about two weeks before her
death, Mrs. Hayden desired and intended to give to the petitioner
her part of the dwelling-house, and to change her will accordingly, but was unwilling to do so without the consent of the respendent." Thus it is plain that the intention and desire of the
deceased were conditioned upon the consent of the respondent.
.The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARK, C. J.-This case is clearly one of fraud. We have held
on the present circuit (Ayres v. French, not yet reported), in
accordance with numerous decisions, that whosoever buys personal
property with a preconceived intention not to pay for it, is guilty
of fraud. This case is similar in principle. It matters but little
whether the property is real or personal 'estate. Whosoever buys
real estate with a preconceived secret intention not to pay for it,
but to cheat the grantor out of it, is as much guilty of fraud as he
would be if the property was personal estate. Apply this principle
to the case we have in .hand. The property in controversy belonged to Frances M. Hayden, and while it was yet hers to be disposed of as she pleased, she informed the respondent that she
desired to give it to the petitioner if he was willing, and asked him
if he was willing, again expressing her desire so to give it. A
codicil to her will had been at this time prepared and laid before
her ready to be executed. The respondent knew by the inquiry
and by the preparation what her purpose was. She had previously, by a duly-executed will, given all her property to the respondent. He knew now that she had changed her mind, and was
about to give the real estate in question in legal form to the petitioner, but that she desired his consent to the change, if it could
be obtained. He immediately resorted to deception. He substantially expressed his entire assent to the change, but suggested the
mode in which it would best be accomplished in her weak condition. He said in effect, let me take the property, as you have
already willed it to me, and when it co:mes into my hands, I will
deed it to the petitioner, and in that way your present desire with
regard to the disposition of the property will be carried out, as
much as it would be by executing the codicil; therefore in your
weak condition do not trouble yourself about it. She was satisfied
that the petitioner would have the property in the way proposed,
and so expressed herself, and consequently the codicil was left
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unexecuted; or, in other words. she let him have the property on
his promise to convey it to the petitioner.
Now it is a prestimption of law that a party intends to do what
in fact le does; and the fact appearing in the case that, after the
property came into the hands of the respondent, he at all times
absolutely refused to convey it to the petitioner, it must be that
during some period of time previous to his first refusal he must
have so intended; and inasmuch as there is nothing in the case
which goes to show a different intention at any previous time, it is
reasonable to presume that this intention exi ted during the short
period of time that had intervened since the promise was made,
and existed at the time it was made; from which it follows that the
promise was made in bad faith, with the dishortest intention to do
what he afterwards did. If this was so, then the case is clearly
one of fraud. It is the case of one obtaining the conveyance of
property by a promise, which he has no intention at the time to
fulfil.
But it is unnecessary to pursue this question of fraud, for the
case otherwise is palpably one where the respondent holds the property in trust for the petitioner, whether lie made the promise in
good or bad faith. If A, knowing that B is about to convey
certain real estate to (, which the latter has purchased of him,
should say to B, "Convey the property to me and I will convey
it to ," and B should accede to the request, and convey the property to A, no one would question but that A would hold the
property in trust for (. Is this case any different in principle ?
Mrs. Hayden was on the point of giving this property to the petitioner by the execution of a codivil to her will, which had been
prepared. The respondent knowing die lhct, said to her in effect,
"Let me have the property by the will you have already executed
and I will convey it to the petitionir." The respondent by this
promise obtained the property. It would seem that no argutient
need be made to show that lie hohl. it in trust.
But it is said that she did not intend to execute the codicil
unless the respondent was willing that she should do so. We do
not so understand the report of the committee. But grant that it
was so; did he not in the plainest and nw(st unmistakable language
give her to understand that he was willing? What did she desire
to have done? She wanted the petitioner to have the property.
What request did she make of the respondent? She asked him
VOL. XXIII-61
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if he was willing that the petitioner .should have it. Whether the
conveyance was to be made in one form or another was of no consequence, and firmed no part of the substance of the inquiry,
although he took it for granted that she intended to do it by executing the codicil that lay before her, which was in fact her intention. What reply did he make ? He said that she was weak, that
she need not trouble herself to sign the paper (meaning the codicil),
that he would deed the property to the petitioner, and would do
just as she wanted to have him ; that is I will do just what you
ask my consent to have done; therefore do not trouble yourself in
your weak condition to execute the codicil. If this language does
not convey a consent that.the petitioner should have the property,
then language in any form of words would fail to express the idea.
It follows, therefore, that the respondent obtained the prbperty
in question by his promise to convey the same to the petitioner,
and consequently we think he is bound in equity and good. conscience to make the conveyance.
We advise the Superior Court to grant the prayer of the
petition.
The foregoing case is decided upon a
clearly-established rule of law, that
where the devisee of an estate induces
the testator to omit making further testamentary disposition of the estate so
devised, by representing that lie will dispose of the estate so devised in a particular manner in conformity with the
wishes of the testator expressed to the
devisee, the testator omitting to make
further disposition of the estate by reason
of his confidence that the estate will,
after his decease, be by the devisee conveyed according to the assurances given
by him. Equity will compel such conveyance upon the petition of the party
to be benefited thereby. It is upon the
ground that the law compels the fraudulent devisee to stand as trustee for the
party entitled. The law raises a trust
•o the extent of the fraud, the same as if
,the trust had been expressed in the devise. The precise point was decided in
an early case: Derenish v. Baines, Prec.
Ch. 3. And the same principle is de-

qlared in Oldham v. Litchford, 2 Vern.
506; and in Barrow v. Greenough, 3 Ves.
Jr. 152; Chamberlainv. Agar, 2 Ves. &
B. 262; McCornidv. Grogan,L. R. 4 H.
Lds. 82 ; Norrisv. Frazer,L.R. 15 Eq.
318. And some American cages have
taken the same view: CAamberlaine v.
Chamberlaine,Freem. Chi. 34; Nutt v.
Nutt, 2-C. & P. 430 ; Yates v. Cole, 1
Jones Eq. I10. See also 1 Story Eq.
Jur. 105a. The question is learnedly
discussed in Williams v. ritch, 18 N. Y.
547; Redf. Lead. Am. Cases on Wills
607, and the same views maintained.
But as it is well settled that cburts of
equity cannot reform a will so as to
give it the effect intended, we should not
be surprised to find a very general impression among the profession that equity
does not interfere to give effect to the
intentions of the testator in any case,
where for any reason he has omitted br
failed to express such intention in the
mode prescribed in the -Statuteof Wills.
But there can be no question in regard
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to cases of the same character with the
.principal case. So, too, it has been
lield, that one may make a binding contract to dispose of a portion, or all his
estate, in a particular manner by his
will, as in the case of marriage settlements, and that a court of equity will
carry the contract into effect after the
decease of the testator, or even before
probably, except as the party, unless
limited in time by tile terms of the contract, would have all his lifetime to

make his will according to the stipulations of his contract, and consequently
a bill during his lifectimhe for specitic
performance of the contract, would be
held premature: Johnson v. TIubbell, 2
Stock. Ch. 332. We regard the case as
one of special interest, in consequence
of tle principle involved being one of
importance, and at tile same time not so
fully understood, by the profession at
large as many others of far less signifiI. F. IR.
cance.

Supreme Court of the Vzited States.
TIE LOTAWANNA.
It is settled by repeated adjudications of this court, that material-men furnishing
repairs and supplies to a vessel in her home port do not acquire thereby any lien
upon the vessel by the general maritime law as received in the United States.
Whilst the general maritime law is the basis of the maritime law of the United
States, as well as of other countries, it is only so far operative in this, or any
country, as it is adopted by the lairs and usages thereof. It has no inherent force
of its own.
In particular matters, especially such as approach a merely municipal character,
the received maritime law may differ in different countries without affecting the
general integrity of the system as a harmonious whole.
'rite general system of maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers anti
statesmen of this country when the Constitution was adopted, was intended, and
referred to when it was declared in that instrument, that the judicial power of tie
United States shall extend " to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
Thus adopted, it became the maritime law of the United States, operating uniformly in the whole country.
The question as to the true limits of maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction is
exclusively a judicial question, and no state law or Act of Congress can make it
broader or narrower than the judicial power may determine those linrits to be.
fBut what the law is within those limits, assuming the general maritime law to be
the basis of the system, depends on what has been received as law in the maritime
usages of this country, and on such legislation as may have been competent to
affect it.
"Senmble, That Congress, under the power to regulate commerce, has authority to
establish a lien on vessels of the United States in favor of material-men, uniform
throughout the whole country.
In particular cases, in which Congress has not exercised the power of regulating
commerce, with which it is invested by the Constitution, and where the subject
does not in its nature require the exclusive exercise of that power, the states, until
Congress acts, may continue to legislate.
Hence, liens granted by the laws of a state in favor of material-men for fur-
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rushing necessaries to a vessel in her home port in said state are valid, though the
contract to furnish the same is a maritime contract, and can only be enforced by
proceedings in rem in the District Courts of the United States.
Any person having a specific lien on, or a vested right in, a surplus fund in
court, may apply by petition for the protection of his interest under the 43d Admiralty Rule.
Separate libels were filed in 1871, against a steamboat, for wages, for salvage,
for supplies furnished at her home port, and for the amount due on a mortgage:
Held, On the evidence, that the lien for supplies had not been perfected under the
state law; and, if it had been, that the libels for such supplies could not be stistained prior to the recent change in the 12th Admiralty Rule: Held, also, That the
libel upon the mortgage could not be sustained as an original proceeding, but that
the mortgagees having petitioned for the surplus proceeds of the vessel, were entitled to have the same applied to their mortgage.
APPEAL

in admiralty from the Circuit Court for the District of

Louisiana.
The libel was filed in the District Court of the United States
on June 10th 1871, by William Doyle and another, against the
steamer Lotawauna, of New Orleans, for mariners' wages. The
vessel being seized, libels of intervention were afterwards filed by
various parties, some for mariners' wages, some for salvage services, some for supplies, materials and repairs furnished in the port
of New Orleans, for the use of the steamer. On June 20th 1871,
Catharine Rodd, administratrix, and others, filed a libel of intervention by which they set up a mortgage on the vessel, given to
them by the owner, on May 20th -1871, and duly recorded in the
custom-house on May 22d, to secure the payment of various
promissory notes of the same date, given to said libellants by the
said owner, and amounting to more than $14,000.
The steamer, up to the 16th of May, had been engaged in the
river trade on the Mississippi and Red rivers, between New Orleans and Jefferson, in . Texas, and was laid up for repairs at New
Orleans on that day. Most of the 'claims for wages and supplies
arose before the date of the mortgage, although some arose afterwards. The steamer was sold for $7500, and, after deducting
expenses of sale, costs, salvage, and wages, of mariners (which
-were admitted to have preference), there remained a surplus of
$4644.42, which the District Court decreed to be paid pro rata
to the mortgage-creditors, to the exclusion of the claims for repairs and supplies. .This decree was reversed by the Circuit Court,
on appeal, and the surplus was decreed to be paid pro ratw to the
claimants for repairs and supplies, to the exclusion of the mortgage.
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creditors, the amount not being sufficient to pay either class of
creditors in full. From the latter decree an appeal was taken to
this court.
The case was argued at December Term 1873, by T. J. Semmes,
for the appellant, and J. A. Grow and L. M. Day, for the
appellees ; and again at October Term 1874, by R. Mfott, for the
appellant, and J. A. Grow, for the appellees, and by W. W.
Goodrich, in favor of the lien for supplies furnished a vessel in
her home port, and by William Allan Butler and'Andrew Boardinan, in opposition to such lien.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BRADLEY, J.-The principal questions raised in this case were
decided by this court adversely to the lien more than fifty years
ago in the case of Thie General Smith, 4 Wheaton 438, and that
decision has ever since been adhered to, except occasionally in
some of the District Courts. A solemn judgment relied on so
long by the commercial community as a rule of property and the
law of the land, ought not to be overruled except for very cogent
reasons. If, however, in the progress of investigation, and with
the new lights that have been thrown upon the whole subject of
maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction, a more rational vie; of
the question demands an adverse ruling in order to preserve harmony and logical consistency in the general system, the court
might, perhaps, if no evil consequences of a glaring character were
likely to ensue, feel constrained to adopt it. But if no such necessity exists, we ought not to permit any consideration of mere
expediency or love of scientific completeness, to draw us into a
substantial change of the received law. The additional security
which has been extended to bills of sale and mortgages on ships
and vessels since the passage of the act for recording them, in the
custom-house; and the confidence with which purchasers and mortgagees have invested money therein under the existing course of
decisions on this subject, have placed a large amount of property
at undue hazard, if those decisions may lightly, or without grave
cause, be disturbed.
The ground on which we are asked to overrule the judgment in
the case of The General Smith is, that by the general maritime
law, those who furnish necessary materials, repairs and supplies to
a vessel, upon her credit, have a lien on such a vessel therefor, as
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well when furnished in her home port as when furnished in a
foreign port, and that the courts of admiralty are bound to give
effect to that lien.
The proposition assumes that the general maritime law governs
this case, and is binding on the courts of the United States.
But it is hardly necessary to argue that .the maritime law is only
so far operative as law in any country as it is adopted by the laws
and usages of that country. In this respect it is like international
law or the laws of war, which have the effect of law in no country
any further than they are accepted and received as such ; or, like
the case of the civil law, which forms the basis of most European
laws, but which has the force of law in each state only so far as it
is adopted therein, and with such modifications as are deemed expedient. The adoption of the common law by the several states
of this Union also presents an analogous case. It is the basis of
all the state laws; but is modified as each sees fit. Perhaps the
maritime law is more uniformly followed by commercial nations
than the civil and common laws are by those who use them. But,
like those laws, however fixed, definite and beneficial the theoretical code of maritime law may be, it can have only so far the
effect of law in any country as it is permitted to have. But the
actual maritime law can hardly be said to have a fixed and definite
form as to all the subjects which may be embraced within its scope.
Whilst it is true that the great mass of maritime law is the same
in all commercial countries, yet, in each country, peculiarities
exist either as to some of the rules, or in the mode of enforcing
them. Especially is this the case on the outside boundaries of the
law, where it comes in contact with, or -shades off into the local
or municipal law of the particular country, and affects only its own
merchants or people in their relations to each other. Whereas,
in matters affecting the stranger or foreigner, the commonly received law of the whole commercial world is more assiduously observed-as, in justice, it should be. No one doubts that every
nation may adopt its own maritime code. France may adopt one;
England another; the United States a third; still, the convenience
of the commercial world, bound together as it is, by mutual relations of trade and intercourse, demands that, in all essential
things, wherein those relations bring them in contact, there should
be a uniform law founded on natural reason and justice. Hence
the adoption by all commercial nations (our own included) of the
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general maritime law as the basis and groundwork of all their
maritime regulations. But no nation regards itself as precluded
from making occasional modifications suited to its locality and the
genius of its own people and institutions, especially in matters
that are of merely local and municipal consequence and do not
affect other nations. It will be found, therefore, that the maritime
codes of France, England, Sweden and other countries, are not
one and the same in every particular; but that whilst there is a,
general correspondence between them arising from the fact that
each adopts the essential principles, and the great mass of the
general maritime law, as the basis of its system, there are varying
shades of difference corresponding to the respective territories,
climate and genius of the people of each country respectively.
Each state adopts the maritime law, not as a code havirg any independent or inherent force, proprio vigore, but as its own law,
with such modifications and qualifications as it sees fit. Thus
adopted and thus qualified in each case, it becomes the maritime
law of the particular nation that adopts it. And without such
voluntary adoption it would not be law. And thus it happens,
that, from the general practice of commercial nations in making
the same general law the basis and groundwork of their respective
maritime systems, the great mass of maritime law which is-thus
received by these nations in common, comes to be the common
maritime law of the world.
This account of the maritime law, if correct, plainly shows that,
in particular matters, especially such as approach a merely municipal character, the received maritime law may differ in different
countries without affecting the general integrity of the system as
a harmonious whole. The government of one country may be
willing to give to its citizens, who supply a ship with provisions at
her home port where the owner himself resides, a lien on the ship;
whilst that of another country may take a contrary view as to the
expediency of such a rule. The difference between them in a
matter that concerns only their own citizens, in each case, cannot
seriously affect the harmony and consistency of the commcn maritime law which each adopts and observes.
This view of the subject does not, in the slightest degree, detract
from the proper authority and respect due to that venerable law
of the sea, which has been the subject of such high encomiums
fiom the ablest jurists of all countries; it merely places it upon
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the just and logical grounds upon. which, it is accepted, and, with
proper qualifications, received with the binding force of law in all
countries.
The proposition, therefore, that by the general maritime law a
lien is given in cases of the kind now under consideration, does
not advance the argument a single step, unless it be shown to be
in accordance with the maritime law as accepted and received in
the United States. It certainly has not been the maritime law of
England for more than two centuries past; and whether it is the
maritime law of this country depends upon questions which are
not answered by simply turning to the ordinary European treatises
on maritime law, or the codes or ordinances of any particular.,
country.
That we have a maritime law of our own, operative throughout
the United States, cannot be doubted. The general system of
maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of
the country when the Constitution was adopted, was most certainly
intended and referred to when it was declared in that instrument
that the judicial power of the United States shall extend "to all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." But by what criterion are we to ascertain the precise limits of the law thus adopted?
The Constitution does not define it. It does not declare whether
it was intended to embrace the entire maritime law as expounded
in the treatises, or only the limited and restricted system which
was received in England; or lastly, such modification of both of
these as was accepted and recognised as law in this country. Nor
does the Constitution attemlit to draw the boundary-line between
maritime law and local law; nor does it lay down any criterion
for ascertaining that boundary. It assumes that the meaning of
the phrase "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" is well understood. It treats this matter as it does the cognate ones of common
law and equity, when it speaks of "cases in law and equity," or
of " suits at common law," without defining those terms, assuming
them to be known and understood.
One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must
have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating
uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have
been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law
under the disposal and regulation of the several states,. as that
would have defeated ihe uniformity and consistency at which the
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Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the states with each other or with foreign
states.
The question is discussed with great felicity and judgment by
Chief Justice TANEY, delivering the opinion of the court in the
case of The St. Lawrence, 1 Black 526, 527, where he says:
"Judicial power, in all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, is delegated by the Constitution to the Federal government in general terms, and courts of this character had then been
established in all commercial and maritime nations, differing, however, materially in different countries in the powers and duties
confided to them ; the extent of the jurisdiction conferred depending very much upon the character of the government in which
they were created; and this circumstance, with the general terms
of the grant, rendered it difficult to define the exact limits of its
power in the United States. This difficulty was increased by the
complex character of our government, where separate and distinct
specified powers of sovereignty are exercised by the United States
and a state independently of each other within the same territorial
limits. And the reports of the decisions of the court will show
that the subject has often been before it, and carefully considered,
without being able to fix with precision its definite boundaries;
but certainly no state law can enlarge it, nor can an Act of Congress or rule of court make it broader than the judicial power may
determine to be its true limits. And this boundary is to be ascertained by a reasonable and just construction of the words used in
the Constitution, taken in connection with the whole instrument,
and the purposes for which admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
was granted to the Federal government."
Guided by these sound principles, this court has felt itself at
liberty to recognise the admiralty.jurisdiction as extending to
localities and subjects which, by the jealousy of the common law,
were prohibited to it in England, but which fairly belong to it on
every ground of reason when applied to the peculiar circumstances
of this country, with its extended territories, its inland seas, and
its navigable rivers, especially as the narrow restrictions of the
English law had never prevailed on this side of the Atlantic, even
in colonial times.
The question as to the true limits of maritime law and admiralty
jurisdiction is undoubtedly, as Chief Justice TANEY intimates, CxVoL. XXIII.-62
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elusively a judicial question, and no state law or Act of Congress
can make it broader or (it may be added) narrower, than the judicial power may determine those limits to be. But what the law
is within those limits, assuming the general maritime law to be the
basis of the system, depends on what has been received as law in
the maritime usages of this country, and on such legislation as
may have been competent to affect it.
To ascertain', therefore, what the maritime law of this country
is, it is not enough to read the French, German, Italian and other
foreign works on the subject, or the codes which they have framed;
but we must have regard to our own legal history, constitution,
legislation, usages and adjudications as well. The decisions of
this court illustrative of these sources, and giving construction to
the laws and Constitution; are especially to be considered; and
when these fail us, we must resort to the principles by which they
have been governed.
But we must always remember that the -.court cannot make the
law, it can only declare it. If, within its proper scope, any change
is desired in its rules, other than those of procedure, it must be
made by the legislative department. It cannot be supposed that
the framers of the Constitution contemplated that the law should
for ever remain unalterable. Congress undoubtedly has the authority under the commercial power, if no other, to introduce
such changes as are likely to be needed. The scope of the maritime law and that of commercial regulation are not coterminous,
it is true, but the latter embraces much the largest portion of
ground covered by the former. Under it Congress has regulated
the registry, enrolment, license and nationality of ships and
vessels; the method of recording bills of sale and mortgages thereon;
the rights and duties of seamen; the limitations of the responsibility of shipowners for the negligence and misconduct of their
captains and crews ; and many other things of a character truly
maritime. And with regard to the question now under consideration, namely, the rights of material-men in reference to supplies
and repairs furnished to a vessel in her home port, there does not
seem to be any great reason to doubt that Congress might adopt
a uniform rule for the whole country, though, of course, this will
be a matter for consideration should the question ever be directly
presented for adjudication.
On this subject the remarks of Mr. Justice NELSON,.in deliver-
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ing the opinion of the court in TVhite's Bank v. Smith, 7 Wall.
633. 656 (which established the validity and effect of the act respecting the recording of mortgages on vessels in the custom-house),
are pertinent. Ile says: " Ships or vessels of the United States
are creatures of the legislation of Congress. None can be denominated such, or be entitled to the benefits or privileges thereof,
except those registered or enrolled according to the Act of September 1st 1789; and those which, after the last day of March
1793, shall be registered or enrolled in pursuance -of the Act of
31st December 1792, and must be wholly owned by a citizen or
citizens of the United States, and be commanded by a citizen of
the same." * * * * "Congress having created, as it were, this
s'pecies of property, and conferred upon it its chief value under
the power given in the Constitution to regulate commerce, we perceive no reason for entertaining any serious doubt but that this
power may be extended to the security and protection of the rights
and title of all persons dealing therein. The judicial mind seems
to have generally taken this direction." This case was subsequently affirmed by Aldrich v. -tna Co., 8 Wall. 491.
Be this, however, as it may, and whether the power of Congress
is or is not sufficient to amend the law on this subject (if amendment is desirable), this court is bound to declare the law as it no"
stands. And according to the maritime law as accepted and received in this country, we feel bound to declare that no such lien
exists as is claimed by the appellees in this case. The adjudications in this court before referred to, which it is unnecessary to
review, are conclusive on the subject; and we see no sufficient
ground for disturbing them.
This disposes of the principal question in the case.
But it is alleged by the appellees that by the law of Louisiana
they have a privilege for their claims, giving them a lien on the
vessel and her proceeds; and that the court was bound to enforce
this lien in their behalf, though not strictly a maritime lien.
On examining the record, however, it appears that the appellees
never caused their lien (if they had one) to be -recorded according
to the requirements of the state law. By the 123d article of the
Constitution of Louisiana, adopted in 1869, it is declared that no
"mortgage or privilege shall hereafter affect third parties, unless
recorded in the parish where the property to be affected is situated."
And an Act of the Legislature, passed since that time, adopts the
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very terms of the constitutional provision. And a further act
provides that if the privileges be not in writing, the facts on which
it is based must be stated in an affidavit, which must be recorded
(Revised Civil Code, articles 3273, 8274, 8093). None of tese
requisites having been perf rmed, no lien can be claimed undei the
state law.
But if there were any diubt on this subject, the case of tb, appellees is met by another difficulty. The admiralty rule of 1859,
which precluded the Distript Courts from entertaining proceedings
in rem against domestic ships for supplies, repairs or other necessaries, was in force until May 6th 1872, when the new rule was
promulgated. Now, this case was commenced in the District
Court a year previous to this, and final judgment in the District
Court was rendered two months previous. It is true that the
judgment of the Circuit Court, on appeal, was not rendered until
the 3d day of June, 1872; but if the new rule had at that time
been brought to the attention of the court, it could hardly have
been applied to the case in its then position. All the proceedings
had been based and shaped upon other grounds and theories, and
not upon the existence of that rule. It would not have been just to
the other parties to apply to them a rule which was not in existence when they were carrying on the litigation.
As to the recent change in the admiralty rule referred to, it is
sufficient to say, that it was simply intended to remove all obstruetions and embarrassments in the way of instituting proceedings in
rem in all cases where liens exist by law, and not to create any
new lien, which, of course, this court could not do in any event,
since a lien is a right of property, and not a mere matter of procedure.
Had the lien been perfected, and.had the rule not stood in the
way, the principles that have heretofore governed the practice of
the District Courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction, and which
have been repeatedly sanctioned by this court, would undoubtedly
have authorized the material-men to file a libel against the vessel or
its proceeds. The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438; Peyroux v.
Howard, 7 Peters 324; The Orleans v. Phoebus, 11 Id. 175 ;
The St. Lawrence, 1 Black 522. It seems to be settled in our
jurisprudence that so long as Congress does not interpose to regulate
the subject, the rights of material-men furnishing necessaries to a
vessel in her home port may be regulated in each state by state
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legislation. State laws, it is true, cannot exclude the contract for
furnishing such necessaries from the domain of admiralty jurisdiction, for it is a maritime contract, and they cannot alter the limits
of that jurisdiction; nor can they confer it upon the state courts
so as to enable them to proceed in rem for the enforcement of
liens created by such state laws, for it is exclusively conferred
upon the District Courts of the United States. They can only
authorize the enforcement thereof by common-law remedies, or
such remedies as are equivalent thereto. But the District Courts
of the United States having jurisdiction of the contract as a maritime one, may enforce liens given for its security, even when
created by the state laws.
The practice may be somewhat
anomalous, but it has existed from the origin of the 'government, and, perhaps, was originally superinduced by the fact that
prior to the adoption of the Constitution, liens of this sort
created by state laws had been enforced by the state courts of admiralty; and as those courts were immediately succeeded by the
District Courts of the United States, and in several instances the
judge of the state court was transferred to the District Court, it
was natural, in the.infancy of federal legislation on commercial
subjects, for the latter courts to entertain jurisdiction over the
game classes of cases, in every respect as the state courts ha(I
done, without due regard to the new relations which the states had
assumed towards the maritime law, and admiralty jurisdiction.
For example, in 1784 the Legislature of Pennsylvania passed a
law allowing persons concerned in building, repairing, fitting out
and furnishing vessels for a voyage, to sue in admiralty, as mariners
sue for wages. Two cases, those of The Collier, and The Enterprise, arising under this law, and coming before the Admiralty
Court of Pennsylvania, are reported in Judge HormINsom's works,
volume 8, pp. 131, 171. No doubt other cases of the same kind
occurred in the courts of other states.
But, whatever may have been the origin of the practice, and
whether or not it was based on the soundest principles, it became
firmly settled, and it is now too late to question its validity.
It is true that the inconveniences arising from the often intricate
and conflicting state laws creating such liens, induced this court in
December term 1858, to abrogate that portion of the 12th Admiralty Rule of 1844 which allowed proceedings in rem against
domestic ships for repairs and supplies furnished in the home port,
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andi to allow proceedings in personam only in such cases. But
we have now restored the Rule of 1844, or, rather, we have made
it general in its terms, giving to material-men in all cases their
option to proceed either in rem or in personam. Of course this
modification of the rule cannot avail where no lien exists, but
where one does exist, no matter by what law, it removes all obstacles to a proceeding in rem, if credit is given to the vessel.
It would undoubtedly be far more satisfactory to have a uniform
law regulating such liens, but until such a law be adopted (supposing Congress to have the power) the authority of the states to
legislate on the subject seems to be conceded by the uniform
course of decisions.
Indeed, there is quite an extensive field of border legislation on
commercial subjects (generally local in character) which may be
regulat-.d by state laws until Congress interposes and thereby excludes further state legislation. Pilotage is one of the subjects in
this category. So far as Congress has interposed, its authority is
supreme and exclusive; but where it has not done so, the matter is
still left to the regulation of state laws. And yet this exercise by
the states of the power to regulate pilotage has not withdrawn the
subject, and, indeed, cannot withdraw it from the admiralty jurisdiction of the District Courts: Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How.
299 ; .x parte McNeill, 13 Wall. 236. And, of, course, as before
intimated, this jurisdiction of the state legislatures in such cases is
subject to be terminated at any time by Congress assuming the
control. In some cases this is not so desirable as in others, but in
the one under consideration, if Congress has the power to intervene,
it is greatly to be desired that it should do so. It would be better
to have the subject regulated by the general maritime law of the
country than by differing state laws. The evils arising from conflicting lien laws passed by the several states are forcibly set forth
by Chief Justice TANEY in the case of The &St.Lawrence, before
cited. It may be added that the existence of secret liens is not in
accord with the spirit of our commercial usages, a td a uniform
law by which the liens in question should be required within a
reasonable time to be placed on record in the custom-house like
mortgages, and otherwise properly regulated, would be of great
advantage to the business community.
But there is another mode in which the appellees, if they had a
valid lien, could come into the District Court and claim the benefit
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thereof, namely, by a petition for the application of the surplus
proceeds of the vessel to the payment of their debts, under the 43d
Admiralty Rule. The court has power to distribute surplus proeceds to all those who can show a vested interest therein, in the
order of their several priorities, nn matter how their claims originated : Schuckardt v. Babbidge, 19 Howard 239. The propriety
of such a distribution in the admiralty has been questioned on the
ground that the court would thereby draw to itself equity jurisdiction: 3 Knapp's Privy Council 111. But it is a wholesome
jurisdiction very commonly exercised by nearly all superior courts,
to distribute a fund rightfully in its possession to those who are
legally entitled to it; and there is no sound reason why admiralty
courts should not do the same. If a case should be so coinplicated as to require the interposition of a court of equity, the
District Court could refuse to act, and refer the parties to a more
competent tribunal. See cases reviewed in 1 Conklin's Admiralty
48-66, 2d ed.
In this case the appellants themselves have no maritime lien,
but merely a mortgage to secure an ordinary debt notTounded on
a. maritime contract. They, therefore, have no standing in court,
except under the 43d Admiralty Rule, and in the manner above
indicated. Their libel was inadmissible, even under the admiralty
rule as recently modified: The John Jay, 17 Howard 399. But
before the final decree they filed a petition for the surplus proceeds,
and, as there is no question in the case about fraudulent preference
under the bankrupt law, they are entitled to those proceeds towards satisfaction of their mortgage.
The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, and it is ordered
that the record be remanded, with instructions to enter a decree
in favor of the appellants, in conformity with this opinion.
CLIFFORD

and

FIELD, JJ.,

dissented.'

1 We have been favored also with a copy of the elaborate dissenting opinion

of CLIFFORD, J., and regret that want of space prevents .our publishing it herewith,-ED. Am. L. R.
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Supreme Uourt of Alabama."
PARKS ET AT,. v. COFFEE ET AL.
The states that joined the -Confederate government continued notwithstanding
that act to be states, and their governments, legislatures, courts, officers, &c., when
regularly and duly constituted according to their own laws, as in the case of Alabama, were officers dejure as well as defacto.
The acts of the several states in their individual capacities, and of their departments of government, executive, judicial and legislative, during the war, so far

as they did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority
or the just rights of citizens under the Constitution, weie valid and binding.
The courts of Alabama, during the war, were a portion of the rightful dejure
government of the state; and their judgments, decrees and proceedings, not in
violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States or of any right or
obligation arising under them, and not in violation of the Constitution of Ala-

bama, are valid and must have operation and effect accordingly.
No act of the legislature or ordinance of a convention is necessary to such validity.
A judgment in an Alabama court in 1861, in a suit between persons within its
jurisdiction, and a subsequent sale of land under execution on that judgment,
passed a good title to the purchaser.

BILL for injunction. Appellants were in possession of certain
land purchased in October 1866, at a sheriff's sale under a pluries
writ of execution upon a judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson county, rendered in 1861, during the late war, against Wallace
and Chitty. The land belonged to defendant Chitty. A writ of
execution, on which the costs and interest were made, was issued
on this judgment in 1862; another was issued June 28th 1866;
and next in order to this; without the lapse of a term, was the
pluries writ, under which the sale was made.
Appellants claimed the land under another title also. In March
1866, it was attached by the sheriff of Jackson county, by virtue
of a writ of attachment in a suit of Falls and Cunningham against
Wallace and Chitty, in which judgment was rendered in 1867 in
favor of the plaintiffs; and appellants show a sheriff's deed to
them, as purchasers of the same land under this judgment also.
The appellee, who was defendant in this cause below, had caused
this same land to be attached in September 1866, under a writ of
attachment in a suit of his own against said Chitty ; and having
afterwards obtained a judgment therein, he was pressing a sale of
the land under an execution upon the judgment.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
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MAIXXNG,

J.-The bill in this cause was filed by appellants,

for an injunction against the proceeding by appellee, and to remove
the cloud it cast upon their title. And as under the decisions of
this court after the reconstruction of it in 1868, judgments rendered
during the war were held incapable of sustaining execution on
them, and of creating liens upon property, after the war-the
struggle of the parties to this cause was, on the part of the appellee, to assail the title of appellants under the second judgment
rendered after the war, and on the part of appellants, to maintain
that title. It is not necessary, however, to review the evidence
relating to this contest (which occupies a large part of the record),
if under the later decisions of this court, and in our opinion,
judgments rendered during the war, are not, for that reason,
invalid.
For the appellee, it is insisted, that, according to the decisions
of our immediate predecessors, judgments rendered in the courts
of Alabama during the war, are to be considered as having no
other effect than as the judgments of foreign courts, of which, as
such, execution could not now be had in our courts. Such decisions were made; but they were afterwards modified by the same,
or some of the same judges, who made or concurred in them.
The times, indeed, were not then favorable to the formation 5f
correct opinions. Everything was disestablished The Confederate government, with all its departments, offices and great
powers, had gone down before men's eyes, and was seen no more.
The state governments were topled over; and military administrations were set up in their stead. To these succeeded civil
governments, that had been solemnly instituted by delegates
from the people assembled in conventions. These again were
overturned and denounced as illegal, by the Acts of Congress,
mnown as the Reconstruction Laws, and others were established to
take their places.
We are only referring to these events, not criticising them. It
does not come within the scope of our duties on this bench, to
pass judgment on the conduct or policy of any of the actors in
those tragic scenes. But there was a general instability of the
most important institutions of society. And in the conflict of passions and interest by which it was produced, principles became indistinct, and the minds of men possessed by lawless and extravagant ideas.
VOL. XXIII.-63
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That much greater evil, than that we have hitherto suffered, did
not result from this condition of things, is largely due to the
moderation, wisdom and learning of the Supreme Court of the
United States. The influence of its action has been felt in all
the courts of the land. And it is by the light which that tribunal has shed upon the subject, that we propose to proceed in
our investigation of the questions--what authority is due to the
judgments and decrees of the courts of Alabama rendered during
the war, and what was the status of those courts?
In 1867, the case of Walker v. Villavaso, 6 Wall. 124, came
before that court. The facts concerning it, are these: In 1861,
Louisiana had (according to the report of the case) "passed an
ordinance of secession from the Union, adopted the Constitution
of the rebel states, required all office-holders to swear allegiance
to it, and had been proclaimed in a state of insurrection by the
President of the United States." After this, in October 1861, a
decree'for the foreclosure of a mortgage, and sale of the mortgaged property, was made by a District Court of that state. In
1867, after the war was over, this decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, then reconstituted and a loyal court.
In the Supreme Court at Washington, it was insisted, that it must
take judicial cognisance of the facts mentioned, which (as it was
urged) made the decree of the District Court void, as that of an
insurrectionary court under a political organization hostile to the
United States, and so must judicially know that the Appellate
Court of Louisiana, in affirming that decree, decided adversely
to the proposition that it was void for that reason, wherefore the
Supreme Court of the United States should take jurisdiction of
the cause.
But it held, in a brief opinion, that this matter not appearing
by the record to have been in controversy below, the cause could
not be brought before it, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, and it
was, therefore, dismissed. This left the original decree below
(rendered when Louisiana, as one of the Confederate states, was
waging war against the Federal government) to be carried into
effect upon the recognition and affirmance of it, as valid, after the
war, by the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
At the same term (December 1867) of the Supreme Court at
Washington, the question came up in a different form in White v.
Cannon, 6 Wall. 443. This also was from the Supreme Court of
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Louisiana. But this time, it was that court, and not the inferior
one, that was the "Rebel court." And it had, after the ordinance of secession of Louisiana had been passed, reversed the judgment of an inferior loyal court, and rendered a different one in
its stead.
Upon the argument of it at Washington, it was suggested to
the court that the decree of the Appellate Court below was void,
because rendered after the secession of Louisiana from the Union.
But the Supreme Court of the United States, after reviewing the
case, affirmed the decree, and briefly said in conclusion: " The
objection that the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is
to be treated as void, because rendered some days after the passage
of the ordinance of secession of that state, is not tenable: That
ordinance was an absolute nullity, and of itself alone neither
affected the jurisdiction of that court or its relations to the appellate power of this court."
At the next term, came up the great case of the State of Texas
v. White, to which we shall recur hereafter.
In the Circuit Court of the United States at Mobile, in June
1871, Justice BRADLEY, of the Supreme Court, presiding, delivered
the opinion in the case of Loeckhart et al. v. Horn, .Ex., &c., then
there. This was a suit in equity to set aside a will which had
been established in a Probate Court of Alabama, and for the settlement of an administration.
In it he said: "The complainant relies on several grounds for
the suspension of the limitation : first-the fact that civil war was
raging in Alabama and other states, from January 11th 1861,
when the act of secession was adopted, to the close of hostilities
and restoration of order, in the summer or fall of 1865.
1I do not agree that this was a sufficient ground for the suspension of legal remedies and acts of limitations, as between' the
citizens of the Confederate States, any more than it would be as
between citizens of states which adhered to the General Government. It is a fact that the courts of Alabama were open to all
the citizens of the Confederate States, and thefe was no law to
prohibit them from resorting thereto.

*

*

*

*

*

Unless a

country is actually occupied by hostile forces and its laws and
courts are suppressed, it would be giving to the courts too large a
discretion to allow them to decide when and when not, the Statutes of Limitation are in operation, as between their own citizens."
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Having, after reviewing all the grounds, decided that complainants were not excusable for not having brought suit during the
war, in the courts of Alabama, and were therefore, barred of a
part of the relief they claimed, Judge BRADLEY had next to meet
the question of the liability of the executor for funds of the estate
which, in 1864, he had invested in bonds of the Confederate States.
In reference to this he says: "As a general rule, in my judgment,
all transactions, judgments and decrees which took place in conformity with existing laws, in the Confederate States, between the
citizens thereof, during the late war, except such as were directly
in aid of the rebellion, ought to stand good. The exception of
such transactions as were directly in aid of the rebellion, is a
political necessity required by the dignity of the United States
government, and by every principle of fidelity to the Constitution
and laws of our common country."
Having decided that the investment in Confederate bonds vas
directly in aid of the rebellion, and that, therefore, the executor
could have no benefit from that act- -the final question was,
whether the executor should be liable for the funds he had so
invested, as good money, or for their value at the time, as Confederate treasury notes, be having received payment in them as
the currency then in common use. It appeared that the executor
took office in March 1858 ; that the debts from which those funds
arose, were due before the war began ; and that he was urged and
cited to settle the estate in August 1860, and again in January
1861 ; and " he has not shown" (says Judge BRADLEY) "sufficient
excuse for not collecting the funds of the estate before the war
commenced. Had he shown such excuse, I should have felt bound
to charge him only with the value of the funds at the time when
he received them, with a reasonable allowance of time for making
a settlement." "It may be urgeX&" (continued the judge) "that
the decree of the Probate Court made in May 1864, is conclusive
on the question of the executor's diligence. * * * * * *
But a careful examination of that decree shows that this question was not passed upon by the court-. * * * Had the court
decided the question of diligence I should have deemed its decision
on that point conclusive." These large extracts are made because
this opinion of Judge BRADLEY is believed not to be yet published
in any book of reports, and because of its great value in showing
how fully and emphatically the eminent judges of the highest
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court in the land acknowledge the validity and authority (when
not in conflict with the Federal Constitution) of the laws, judicial
proceedings and governmental institutions of the states of the late
Southern Confederacy during the war. In affirning the decree
in this ease the Supreme Court of the United States say, " We
admit that the acts of the several states in their individual capacities, and of their departments of government, executive, judicial
and legislative, during the war, so far as they did not impair or
tend to impair the supremacy of the national authoiity or the jusr
rights of citizens under the Constitution, are in general to be
treated as valid and binding.
"The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen
the bonds of society or do away with civil government or the
regular administration of the law; order was to be preserved, police
regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled and the
transfer and descent of property regulated precisely as in time
of peace. No one that we are aware of, seriously questions the
validity of judicial or legislative acts in the insurrectionary states,
touching these and kindred subjects, when they were not hostile
in their purpose, or mode of enforcement, to the authority of the
national government and did not impair the rights of citizens
under the Constitution :" Horn v. Lockhart et al., 17 Wall. 580.
In harmony with these declarations of the law is the opinion in
Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, as explained in Jjuntington v. Texas,
16 Wall. 402. Quotations to this point from these cases are
needless, and would too much extend this opinion.
But while the validity and authority of the acts, judgments and
decrees of the several departments of the state governments during
the war are so fully and emphatically affirmed, it is nowhere expressly held that those governments were, during that period, the
rightful, legitimate governments of these states. On the contrary,
in Texas v. Wtrhite, supra, the Chief Justice, arqu ndo, says:
" The legislature of Texas, at the time of the repeal, constituted
one of the departments of a government established in hostility to
the Constitution of the United States. It cannot be regarled,
therefore, in the courts of the United States as a lawful legislature
or its acts as lawful acts. And yet it is an historical fact that the
government of Texas, then in full control of the state, waw its only
actual government, and certainly if Texas had been a separate
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state and not one of the United States, the new government, having
displaced the regular authority and established itself in the customary seats'of power and in the exercise of the ordinary functions
of administration, would have constituted in the scrictest sense of
the words a de facto government, and itsacts during its existence
as such would be effectual and in almost all respects valid. And
to some extent this is true of the actual government of Texas,
though unlawful and revolutionary as to the United States."
The Chief Justice then goes on, without intending (as h says)
to be full and exact, to speak of the acts of such a government
which must be treated as valid, and concludes by saying "that acts
in furtherance or support of rebellion against the United States or
intended to defeat the just rights of citizens, and other acts of
like nature, must, in general, be regarded as invalid andl void,"
which, accompanied by the explanation made in tuntington v.
Texas, supra, corresponds with what we have before quoted from
Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 580.
Of the paragraph above from the opinion in Texas v. White,
without adverting to its defective logic, two things are to be noted.
First, The Chief Justice had previously mentioned that the Governor and Secretary of State of Texas, having refused to take an
oath of al!egiance to the Confederate States, " were summarily
ejected from office." And since he speaks in the passage above,
of "the new government having displaced the regular authority,"
&c., we must infer that he had in mind this government, referred
to as established by actual usurpation, when he was speaking of its
status and authority. And secondly: All those acts which he
says "must be regarded as invalid and void,"' if done by the
"actual government of Texas, though unlawful and revolutionary
as to the United States," would be equally "invalid and void,"
if done by the lawful and regular government, before secession
from the United States.
Hence no support is afforded by that opinion, to the proposition,
that the government of Alabama (which was not established by
the expulsion of any person from office, and the introduction of
an usurper in his place), was not the government de jure of
this state during the war. But other portions of that opinion
enable us to demonstrate the contrary.
"We have already," says the Chief Justice, "had occasion to
remark, at this term, that the people of each state compose a state
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having its own government and endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence; and that without
the states in union, there could be no such political body as the
United States :" County of Lane v. The State of Oregon, 7 Wall.
76. "Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and
independent autonomy to the states, through their union under
the Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the
preservation of the states, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution,
as.the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the
National Government. The Constitution in all its provisions looks
to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible states."
These are noble sentences.
Before the war then and while in the Union, Alabama wos endowed with autonomy. Her people composed "a state having its
own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to
a separate and independent existence." Those who constituted
this government, were elected into it by this people. They were
not appointees of any officials of the United States. Their tenure
of office did not depend upon any Federal functionary. They
could not be deposed, or their places supplied, by the action of any
one from without the state. In fine, they composed a government created by the people of Alabama, for the enactment and
enforcement of the laws of this people, were responsible for their
official acts only to this people, could be succeeded. in office only
by those whom this people.should elect, and possessed rightfully,
dejure, all the powers of government, except those which were
denied to them by the Constitution of Alabama. and the Constitution of the United States. The rightful government thus constituted and thus endowed with the powers and faculties of
administration which Alabama had before, and when the act of
secession was passed, continued without change, except by the
regular election or appointment of successors to the persons whose
terms of office expired, down to the close of the war. If any of
its members ceased to be lawful members of thIe government while
they acted as such, and became merely defacto members of it, or
only actual members, they were then usurpers of the seats of authority which belonged to others. Who were those others, that
were thus expelled or kept out? Who claimed to be so? Who,
if the incumbents had vacated their offices, would have had the
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right, or claimed that they had the right, to take and occupy
them ?
These questions cannot be answered. And why not ? Because
the incumbents of those offices were not usurpers of them, but
rightfully in possession.
Is there some dim idea, however, that although this be true of
the persons exercising authority, yet the state government itself
with its departments and offices had become defunct? How could
this happen ? Whether in the Union or out of it, Alabama did'
not cease to be a state. Some of her elder sisters were staten
with their separate -and independent governments, before the
Union under the Constitution was formed; and any or all of them
might continue to be so, if the Union were utterly dissolved. To
the political community denominated a state the organization which
we call government, is essential; it is of the substance of it, and
a part of the idea which the word expresses. And such an organization was certainly 'quite as necessary to Alabama, while
dissevered from her co-states, as while in union with them. This
is indeed affirmed, or recognised, in most of the passages which
we have quoted from cases in the Federal courts. The latest of
those in the Supreme Court at Washington, relating to this matter,
is that of Sprot v. United States, decided at the present term.
(See report in the January No. 1875 of the American Law Register.) MILLER, J., in delivering the opinion of the court and
speaking of the difference between "the so-called Confederate
government and that of the states," says: "the latter, in most
if not in all instances, merely transferred the existing state organizations to the support of a new and different national head.
The same Constitution, the same laws for the protection of property and personal rights remained, and were administered by the
same officers. These laws, necessary in their recognition and administration to the existence of organized society, were the same
with slight exceptions whether the authorities of the state acknowledged allegiance to the true or the false federal power.
They were the fundamental prindiples for which civil society is
organized into government in all countries, and must be respected
in their administration, under whatever temporary dominant authority they may be exercised."
Anything more conclusive upon this point, it would be needless
to produce. But we may add that it having been repeatedly held
by the highest court in the land, that the acts and ordinances of
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secession were mere nullities, absolutely void, and all the efforts
made in support of them, having proved ineffectual, it follows that
legally, in contemplation of law, Alabama was never out of the
Union. The Constitution and laws of the United States, though
their operation was suspended, continued obligatory within her
borders during all the time of the war, and she continued to be a
member of what the Constitution in all its provisions designed to
be "an indestructible Union composed of indestructible states."
Of course, we are not to be understood as holding that because
the courts and legislatures of Alabama, during the war, were such
rightfully de jure, therefore whatever they did was lawful. Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the persons exercising
lublic functions, employed them in doing many illegal acts, even
treasonable ones. What then ? Concede that they became liable
to be, and were pursued, driven from office and punished by the
Federal Government, and that their official acts of that character must be treated as null and void. All this would not prevent the things which they had officially done that were not in
violation of superior laws, or of the rights and obligations arising
under such laws, from being valid and effectual, any more than
the crimes oft Charles I., and his decapitation for them, or tljose
of James II. for which England dethroned and expelled him,
invalidated the acts which they had lawfully done while they yet
actually swayed the sceptre, as kings dejure of the realm.
Our conclusion then is, that the courts of Alabama, during the
war, were a portion of the rightful, de jure, government of the
state; and that their judgments, decrees and proceedings, not in
violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, or of
any right or obligation arising under them, and not in violation of
the Constitution of Alabama, are valid and must have operation
and effect accordingly.
We have heretofore mentioned that the views of our predecessors
on this point as expressed in Hall v. .Tall, 43 Ala. R. 488 ; Powell- v. Boon, Id. 459; 21artin v. Hewitt, 44 Id. 418, and in
other cases, have been modified by later decisions. We refer to
the cases of Tarver v. Tankersly, .Powell v. Young, and .liddie
v. lUll, delivered at the last (June) term of this court.
In them, it was held, conformably with the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Horn v. Lockhart, sUPra,
that "judicial proceedings in this state during the war, so far as
VOL. XXIII-64
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they did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the
national authority, or the just rights of citizens under the Constitution, are to be treated as binding.
This rectification of the judicial opinion of this court, gave great
satisfaction to the lawyers and people of the state. Its tendency
was to prevent litigation from being fomented, and the peace of
families from being disturbed.
We have gone a step further (we hope with like beneficent consequences), in holding that the courts in which those judicial proceedings were had, were a part of the rightful government of the
state.
One consequence of this holding is-that no act of the legislature, or ordinance of a convention, is necessary to give validity
to the judgments, decrees and proceedings of those courts.
Another consequence is that the records and papers of those
courts during the war, are to be preserved with the same care, and
certified in the same manner, as those of courts held since; and
like punishments are to be inflicted for the destruction, mutilatio&,
abstraction or falsification of the records and papers of the one, as
of the other.
According to our views, the title of the land in controversy
acquired by appellants, under a judgment rendered during the
war, the execution upon which created a lien commencing at an
earlier date than that created by the attachment for appellee, is
valid. And the proceedings of the appellee to have the laid sold
under the judgment in his suit, are injurious to appellants, and
cast a cloud upon their title.
The decree of the Chancellor is reversed, and a decree will be
here rendered perpetually enjoining appellee from further proceeding to sell the land in controversy to satisfy his judgment.
Appellee will pay the costs of this suit in this court and in the
court below.
B13IcKELL, C. J., did not sit in this case.

United States Circuit Court. .Northern -Districtof Bllivois.
OSGOOD v. CHICAGO, DANVILLE & VINCENNES R. R. CO. ET AL.
Under the Act of Congress of March 3d 1875, the Circuit Courts have jurisdiction of actions between citizens of different states, without regard to the fact

that one party may be a citizen of the state where the suit is brought; and undex
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this net such cases may be removed from a state court even by a defendant who
is sited in a court of his own state.
Where there are several defendants, only part of whom ask for the removal of
a cause to a Federal court, the right to such removal depends on the fact whether
or not there is a controversy wholly between the plaintiff and the defendants
asking for the removal, and which can be fully determined as between them.
A bill was filed in an Illinois court by a citizen of Massachusetts, against an
Illinois corporation and its officers, and certain judgment-creditors, who were
citizens of Illinois, to enforce the lien of certain bonds, and to foreclose a mortgage given to secure them. The judgment-creditors, defendants, filed cross-bills,
and there was a demurrer to the bill. The corporation and" sonic of its officers,
including president, treasurer and several of the trustees under the mortgage,
then filed a petition to remove the cause to the Circuit Court. Field, that this was
a controversy wholly between citizens of different states which could be fully determined as between them, and therefore was properly removable.
Held, further, that the fact that certain judgment-creditors whosd rights were
subject to the prior liens of the bonds sought to be enforced, were defendants, and
that some of them had filed cross-bills, could not affect the right of the substantial parties to the issue to remove the cause.
Where there has been a possession of the res acquired by the state court in consequence of the main issue, the temoval of the latter carries with it the possession
of the res to the Federal court, notwithstanding there may be collateral issues
raised which may remain in the state court.
Whether such collateral issues do remain in the state court or are removed by tie
removal of the main controversy, not decided.
A petition for removal under the Act of 1875, may be filed in vacation, and
it is not required that the state court should take any action upon it or upon the
bond.
If the petitioner has the right of removal and files his petition and then files a
copy of the record in the Federal court, the act of removal is complete, and the only
jurisdiction to restore the case to the state court is in the Federal court upon
motion.

ON the 22d of February 1875, the plaintiff, as a bondholder of
the railroad company, filed a bill in the Will county Circuit Court,
against the company and certain defendants (trustees of mortgages
amounting to several millions of dollars, given by the railroad company, including the president and treasurer and members of the
board of directors), to foreclose the mortgage. The bill charged
various breaches of trust on the part of the officers of the company,
aid asked for an injunction to prevent them from negotiating certain bonds of the company, and for a receiver. The court, without notice to the defendants, issued the injunction and appointed
receivers at the time the bill was filed. On the 23d of February,
a petition was filed by some of the non-resident defendants to remove the suit into this court, whiclt was refused by the state
court. On the 24th of February, the bill was amended by making
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various judgment-creditors defendants. On the same day, one of
the judgment-creditors answered and filed a cross-bill praying the
court to enforce the lien against the company, and that the receivers should pay the same. On the 26th of February, on petition, other creditors of the company were made defendants, who
asked leave to file cross-bills. These claims of the judgment and
other creditors were all subsequent in point of time and right to
those of the bondholders under the mortgages. On the 1st of
March certain persons petitioned to be made co-plaintiffs.
There was no action of the court on the petition last referred to,
and the only cross-bill filed was that of the 24th of February, already mentioned. There was a demurrer to the bill, which had
been argued and taken under advisement by the court. There
had also been some incidental motions made in the case, which
need not be particularly referred to. The court had adjourned
for the term. This was accordingly the position of the case, when,
on the 22d day of March, petitions were filed in the suit with the
clerk of the court by the railroad company, a corporation of this
state, Judson the president, and Tenney the treasurer, and by the
trustees Roberts, Fosdick and Fish, asking for the removal of the
cause from the state court to this court, under the Act of Congress of the 3d of March 1875. The petitions alleged that the
amount in controversy was of the value of more than $500, that
the plaintiff'was a citizen of Massachusetts, that the parties who
had petitioned to be made co-plaintiffs- were citizens of Pennsylvania, and that Judson, Tenney and Fish were citizens of New
York, Fosdick a citizen of Connecticut, and Roberts a citizen of
Illinois. Bonds were filed, conditioned as required by the Act
of Congress. A transcript of the record of the suit in the state
court was filed in this court March 24th. This was now a motion
to dismiss the suit, on the ground that this court bad no jurisdiction of the case.
Crawford and HfcDonald, for plaintiff.
Walker and Campbell, for defendants.
seems to have been the intention, in the
DRUMMOND, J.-It
recent act, to consolidate into one act all the previous general Acts
of Congress conferring jurisdiction upon the Circuit Court, and at
the same time to give the court jurisdiction in some cases where no

OSGOOD v,. CHICAGO, D. & V. RAILROAD CO.

previous Act of Congress had conferred it. The court has now
jurisdiction in suits between the citizens of different states, without regard to the fact whether or not one of the parties is a citizen
of the state where the suit is brought. The act also authorizes a
case to be removed from the state to the Federal court under such
circumstances. The Judiciary Act of 1789, as construed by the
Supreme Court, required that each of the parties plaintiff should
have the right to sue each of the parties defendant, in a suit
between citizens of different states, and equally so in the case of
removal from the state to the Federal court under the authority
conferred by the 12th sect. of that act. The act of 1866 declared
that when a suit was brought in a state court by a citizen of that
state against a citizen of another state, and a citizen or citizens of
the same state as the plaintiff, that if the controversy might finally
be determined between the plaintiff and the citizen of the other state
without the presence of the co-defendants, it might be removed to the
Federal court. The recent Act of Congress declares that in any
suit mentioned in the law when there shall be a controversy which is
wholly between citizens of different states, and which can fully be
determined as between them, then either one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove the suit into the Federal court. This is the first time that
Congress has authorized a defendant, a citizen of the state where
the suit is brought, to remove the case from the state to the
Federal court. As this is a case where there are several defendants, some of whom have not joined in the petition for removal, the
question is whether there is a- controversy wholly between the
plaintiff and those who have petitioned for a removal and which
can be fully determined as between them. The controversy in
this case, as between these parties, is whether the bonds referred to
in the bill are valid debts against the company, and the mortgages
can be foreclosed and the claim enforced against the company;
and whether the officers of the company have been guilty of any
of.the breaches of trust alleged against them. The officers named
as defendants, and the railroad company, would seem to be parties
whose rights, as between them and the plaintiff, can be fully determined as being a controversy wholly between them. The other
parties who have joined in the petition for removal are mere
trustees. It is a controversy wholly between citizens of different
states.
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The fact that there are various judgment-creditors, whose rights
are subject to the prior liens of the bondholders, cannot affect the
power of removal-their rights remaining unchanged. Neither
can the fact that a judgment-creditor has filed a cross-bill, for
then it would always be in the power of a creditor to prevent the
operation of the statute. The difficulty arising from the possession
of the res or property by the state court is more apparent than
real. If the res has been seized as an incident of the controversy
between the citizens of different states, then the removal of the
cause into the Federal court transfers the res with it as a necessary
part of the proceedings, and the fact that collateral issues as connected with the res have sprung up in the state court, cannot destroy the right of removal, provided the parties seeking it bring
themselves within the terms of the statute.
The language of the third section is that the petition for the
removal must be filed in the state court before or at the term at
which the cause can first be tried. It may prove in some cases,
particularly those of equity, difficult to determine the term when
the cause can first be tried. It is not claimed in this case that the
petition was not filed in due time, but it is objected that it was
filed in vacation, and not during any term of the court, and that
there was no action of the court upon the petition or on the bond.
I do not think the objection can be sustained on either ground.
The law requires the petition to be filed in the suit, and it may be
before the term, and, in fact, it is often desirable immediately after
a suit is commenced in the sfate court to remove it into the Federal court before there is any action of the state court in the case.
It is true, that under the statute the bond must be good and sufficient security, but it does not declare that it shall be approved
by the judge. It requires the state court to accept the petition
and bond and proceed no further in the case. Now suppose the
state court should refuse to accept the petition or the bond, or
should decide that a bond valid under the law and with good and
sufficient security, was not so, would that deprive the party of the
right of removal? Clearly not. This statute seems to have been
passed with a full knowledge of the difficulties growing out of the
action or non-action of the state courts under previous laws, and
with a determination to make the power of removal independent
of the action of the state court. It is not stated in every case
under this statute, as in those of 1789 and of 1866, that certain
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facts are to appear to the satisfaction of the court. And this is
the more apparent from the authority conferred on the Circuit
Court, by the seventh section, to issue writs of certiorarito the
state courts with power to enforce them, and from what is stated
in the same section as to the time of removal if the Circuit Court
of the United States shall hold its next term within twenty days
after the petition and bond are filed in the state court. The fifth
section was intended to protect a party in case of the improper
removal of a suit from the state to the Federal court, but the language of that section is peculiarly significant as affecting the
motion now before the court. The copy of the record has been
filed in this court, and the law seems to indicate under what circumstances only, in such an event, the case should be .remanded
back to the state court. It is when it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Federal court that the suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the
jurisdiction of the court, or that the parties have been improperly
or collusively made, or joined, for the purpose of creating a case
cognisable under the act. It is true that the act prescribes the
manner in which the removal shall be made, and the directions of
the law should be complied with. But the fifth section does not
authorize the court to remand or dismiss the cause, for the reason
that it may appear that there was any irregularity in the means
taken to procure the removal. The purpose obviously was, if the
record was filed in the Federal court under the law, and the court
could see that it had jurisdiction of the case, it should retain it,
notwithstanding there might be defects in the manner of removal.
It is also objected that the record from the state court, while
certified by the clerk under the seal of the court, has not also the
certificate of the judge. This last has never been considered necessary where the record comes from a court of this state.. The
attestation of the clerk under the seal of the court is sufficient in
any court of this state, and is so in this court. A further objection is that the petition for removal is not verified by affidavit.
That is not required by the Act of 1789 or the Act of 1866, nor
is it by the Act of 1875, though it was by the Act of 1867 : The
Sewing fachine Cases, 18 Wall. 552. So that on the whole I
think it is the duty of the court to allow the case to stand as between the plaintiff and the parties defendant who have petitioned
for its removal into this court, and to overrule the motion to dismiss; and it will be so ordered.
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After the foregoing opinion was delivered a re-argument was

allowed before

DRUMMOND and BLODGETT, JJ., and the opinion

of the court was delivered by
SDRUm MOND, J.-It

has neen insisted on the re-argument, that
this court cannot take jurisdiction of the case, on two grounds:
1st. The case itself is of such a character that it is not removable under the statute. 2d. The case cannot be removed independent of the action of the state court.
The first clause of the second section of the Act of 1875, states
when a case can be removed to the Federal court. It must be a
suit of a civil nature at law or in equity, pending at the date of
the act, or brought thereafter in the state court. The matter in
dispute must exceed $500. It must be a suit arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, * * * * or in which
there shall be a controversy between citizens of different states.
* * * * This clause refers to a removal by either party; that
is by the whole of what constitutes the one side or the other.
The second clause of that section states when a case can be
removed by either party, less than the whole. There must be in
a suit in the state court a controversy wholly between citizens of
different states, and such that it can be fully determined as between them ; if so, then any one or more of the plaintiffs or
defenadnts actually interested in the controversy may remove
"9said suit" into the Circuit Court of the United States.
There was here a civil suit in equity pending in the state court
.at the date of the act, where the matter in dispute exceeded, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $500.
Was there in this suit a controversy wholly between citizens of
different states ? The plaintiff was a citizen of Massachusetts, the
railroad company a citizen of Illinois. The railroad company had
executed to trustees certain mortgages on its property to secure
an indebtedness due from the company, of which the plaintiff held
a part. He was not a trustee of either of the mortgages. The
trustees and some of the officers of the company made defendants
and all of them citizens of different states from that of the plaintiff and the company, petitioned for the removal of the cause.
Now, the controversy between these parties was wholly as to
the debt and the validity of the mortgages and the enforcement
of the same.
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The trustees represented the other creditors as well as the
plaintiff. It was thln in effect a controversy wholly between the
trustees as the representatives of the creditors, anl the railroad
company. There can be no doubt that, so far as it relates to
citizenship, it was entirely competent for the plaintiff to bring his
suit in this court instead of the state court. And having done the
latter, that it was equally competent for the defendants, as the
case then stood, to remove it to the Federal court. Was this
right lost by the subsequent facts which appear in the case ?
After the bill was filed receivers were appointed, and certain
judgment and other creditors were made defendants, one of whom
filed a cross-bill.
The mere possession of the property clearly could not affect the.
result, as appears from the fourth section of the recent act. That
was connected wholly with the controversy of the original parties,
and did not prevent it from being exclusively between them. It
does not appear that any of the creditors were citizens of the same
state as the plaintiff, but conceding that there was a controversy
in the suit whether the judgments were valid liens on the property,
and whether the debts of the other creditors were binding on the
company, and that some of the creditors were citizens of the same
state as the company, was the right of removal gone ?
It is said that the language of the second section of the Act of
1875 is different from the Act of 1866, the former declaring that
either one or more of the parties "may remove said suit" into the
Federal court. It is insisted that means the whole suit and not
the part which involves merely a controversy between citizens of
different states, and therefore, if there should be incidentally a
controversy in the suit between citizens of the same state the
effect would be to remove this last as well as the other, and therefore, the Federal court would take jurisdiction of a controversy
between citizens of the same state, which would be unconstitutional.
If we were to admit the premises we hardly think the conclusion
would follow. If the whole suit is removed beeause of the principal controversy between citizens of different states, and in order
to fully determine that as between them, other controversies between citizens of the same state arise in the suit, there is no
objection to the Federal court taking jurisdiction of the latter.
It is matter of common practice to do this in the settlement of
VOL. XXIIL-65
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legal and equitable rights. Having control and jurisdiction of the
principal, the incidents go with it. In every case where this court
forecloses a railroad mortgage, this doctrine is enforced; so that
the true rule even on the hypothesis stated, would seem to be to
ascertain whether this court had jurisdiction of what may be
regarded as the main controversy, and whether the others between
citizens of the same state, are mere incidents of such controversy.
In this case the claims of the defendant-creditors, it is presumed,
depend on the effect and validity of the mortgages, which, if sustained, give the bondholders the paramount claim. The former
may therefore be said to attend the mortgage-debts. If this is so,
there is no good reason why the whole suit may not be removed
to this court. Whether the act intends to authorize the removal
of the whole suit in every case where there is a controversy between citizens of different states, and which can be fully determined
as between them, without regard to other controversies in the
same suit and the citizenship of the parties in the suit, and
whether, if so, the act is in that respect constitutional, need not
be here decided. Neither is it necessary to decide whether the
act, in any case where there may be in the suit controversies between citizens of the same state, permits them to remain to be
determined by the state court.
Upon the second ground we commence with two admissions
made by the plaintiff's counsel. They concede:
1st. Under the 3d section of the Act of 1875, the petition for
removal and the bond required, can be filed in the suit pending
in the state court in vacation.
2d. If the statute is complied with, the state court has no discretion, and its refusal to accept the petition and bond, and the
omission to note the refusal on the record, would not deprive the
party entitled thereto of the right of removal.
These admissions necessarily grow out of the words of the statute.
If the facts as named therein exist, then the party entitled to
remove the suit may file a petition in such suit in the state court
before the term at which the cause could be first tried, and file
therewith a bond with good and sufficient security. The bond and
petition may therefore both be filed out of term time;- they are to
be filed in the suit pending in the state court, that is, with the
clerk in the ordinary way in which papers are marked and filed
.in a suit. Now, if the proper petition and bond are filed with the
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clerk in the suit pending in the state court by the party entitled
to do so, in vacation, what is the status of the case from the time
of filing the same until the meeting of the state court ?
According to the view of plaintiffs' counsel, the court having
had no opportunity in open court to accept or refuse the bond and
petition, there is jurisdiction still in the state court, and the jutge
of that court can make any order in the case permitted to a judge
under such circumstances; that is, lie can, if necessary, grant an
injunction, and (in this state) appoint a receiver of property.
There ought to be authority somewhere to protect the rights of
parties in the contingency named. Having filed the petition and
bond with the clerk in the given case, the applicant has done all
that the statute requires. He need not call upon the court to
act at all. No order is to be made in court, at least the statute
nmanes none, unless the mandate that the court "shall accept the
petition and bond" implies one.
The language is somewhat different in the other statutes: "shall
accept the surety." When is it that the court shall " proceed no
further in such suit ?" It is well to notice the different language
in another part of the section. When the suit relates to the title
of land, and is between citizens of the same state, then the value
must be made to appear, and certain statements (and affidavit if
required by the court) must be made, all showing the court is
callbd on to act. But it is said that, in this case, the court must
judge whether the bond has good and sufficient security, and must
accept that and the petition. It may be proper to consider the
former legislation on this point. The Act of 1789 required, in
order to effect a removal from the state to the Federal court, that
the defendant should, at the time of entering his appearance in
the state court, file the petition for removal.
The Act of 1866 declared that the petition might be filed " at
any time before the trial or final hearing of the cause ;" but
nothing is said as to the manner of filing other than by the use
of such general words. The Act of 1867 required an affidavit
and petition to be filed in the state court at any time before the
final hearing or trial of the suit.
These acts were all repealed by the Revised Statutes of the
United States, which, however, incorporated their substantial provisions in section 639.
The law in force upon the subject of removal, at the date of the
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Act of 1875, was as follows: "In order to such removal, the petitioner in the cases aforesaid must, at the time of filing his petition
therefor, offlr in said state court good and sufficient security," &c.
The Act of 1875 for the first time expressly authorized the petition and bond to be filed out of term time. There must have
been some object in this change. We think it was to prevent the
state court from proceeding further in the case after the proper
papers were filed in the suit with the clerk.
There was nothing more to be done in order to perfect the right.
A condition of the bond is that the petitioner shall enter in the
Circuit Court of the United States at its next term a copy of the
record of the suit and pay the costs if the suit be wrongfully removed, and is for the benefit of the opposite party.
The seventh section of the statute has an important bearing
on the question. It often happens that the terms of the state
court are only once or twice a year. If after the filing of the
petition and bond in the suit in the state court not in term, the
Circuit Court of the United States should sit before the state
court ; for example, the former in one month and the latter in two
months from the time of filing the petition and bond, if there
must be an opportunity for the state court to act on them before
the right of removal is perfected, how is it possible for the petitioner to comply with the condition of the bond ?
The only answer that can be given is that in spite of the words
of the third section, that the bond and petition may be filed before
the term, there is in fact and law no filing of the petition and
bond until the court is in session, in effect thereby striking those
words out of the statute, and thus the state judge has power over
the case from the commencement till the petition and bond are
presented to him while holding court, which we think Congress
intended he should not have when they were duly filed in vacation.
Under previous laws, in some instances the clerks of the state
court would not give copies of the record when a petition for removal was filed. The recent act imposes a severe penalty in ease
of their refusal to furnish a copy of the record after tender of
the legal fees, to any one applying for removal, not when the removal is ordered or refused by the court. It is said there must be
a power in the state court to determine whether the petition and
bond are sufficient, and whether the case is removable under the
statute. It is true that the party seeking the removal of the
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cause must be entitled to the same, but we think the statute diU
not intend to permit the state court to judge in such a case as this
whether a proper case was made. That was one of the difficulties
under former statutes. If the state court chose to proceed, the
only remedy was supposed to be through the highest court of the
state, to the Supreme Court of the United States. See Hough v.
If. T. Company/, I Bissell 425; Akerly v. Vilas, 2 Bissell
110; In re Cromie, 2 Bissell 160, and authorities, cited in those
cases and notes. This statute gives the Circuit Court of the
United States power to issue the writ of certiorari to the state
court in any cause removable under the act, and therefore to the
Federal court the right to determine whether the cause is .properly
removable.
It is claimed by the plaintiffs' counsel that is given when the
state court refuses to act. But the state court may omit to place
on the record the refusal or non-action, and whether it does or not
there can be no object in issuing a writ of certiorari,the sole effect
of which is to bring the record into the Federal court, if it is already there duly certified by the clerk under the seal of the state
court. This statute has not given power to the Circuit Court of
the United States to compel the state court to act by writ of 2nadamus or otherwise. The sole object of the writ of certiorari,as
the statute itself says, is to make return of the record.
The fifth section contains provisions which are new. It is true
that in practice under previous laws, when a case came into the
Federal court by removal from the state court, motions could be
made to dismiss and remand the case, but their decision depended
on general principles. Now the fifth section controls the action
of the Federal court both as to the dismissal and remanding of
cases. It did not intend the suit should be dismissed or remanded
on account of irregularities, provided it satisfactorily appeared
that the court bad jurisdiction of the cause. Here the only thing
to which objection is now made is as to the character of the suit
and the want of opportunity of the state court, as a court, to act or
refuse to act. There is no complaint made against the sufficiency
of the bond.
It is said we treat the state courts with disrespect in not allowing them to pass upon the case under the statute. We would
treat them more disrespectfully if we disregarded and overruled

